From 07dda36d6ec8fd73ad0019cf0936dad456a95cd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ahmed Darrazi <ahmeddarrazi@MacBookPro.fritz.box>
Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2026 23:22:54 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] spec: clarify 066 rbac ui enforcement defaults

---
 specs/066-rbac-ui-enforcement-helper/spec.md | 14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/specs/066-rbac-ui-enforcement-helper/spec.md b/specs/066-rbac-ui-enforcement-helper/spec.md
index 0015978..8226d05 100644
--- a/specs/066-rbac-ui-enforcement-helper/spec.md
+++ b/specs/066-rbac-ui-enforcement-helper/spec.md
@@ -5,6 +5,14 @@ # Feature Specification: RBAC UI Enforcement Helper v1
 **Status**: Draft  
 **Input**: Provide a suite-wide, consistent way to enforce tenant RBAC for admin UI actions (buttons/actions in lists, records, and bulk actions) without copy/paste authorization logic.
 
+## Clarifications
+
+### Session 2026-01-28
+
+- Q: For Bulk Actions with mixed-permission records (some authorized, some not), what should the default behavior be? → A: All-or-nothing (if any selected record would be unauthorized, the bulk action is disabled for members and execution fails with 403 for members / 404 for non-members).
+- Q: Should the helper render actions at all for non-members (in case a tenant page is reachable via misrouting), or always hide them? → A: Hide for non-members in UI, but still enforce 404 server-side for any execution attempt.
+- Q: How strict should the “no ad-hoc authorization patterns in app/Filament/**” guard be in v1? → A: CI-failing (new ad-hoc patterns fail tests/CI).
+
 ## User Scenarios & Testing *(mandatory)*
 
 <!--
@@ -75,7 +83,7 @@ ### Edge Cases
 
 - Membership is revoked while the user has the page open (execution must still enforce 404 semantics).
 - Capability changes mid-session (UI may be stale; server enforcement remains correct).
-- Bulk actions with mixed-permission records (the safe default behavior is enforced consistently).
+- Bulk actions with mixed-permission records: all-or-nothing (disable + tooltip for members; 403 on execution for members; 404 semantics for non-members).
 - Target record is deleted/archived between render and execution (no information leakage in errors).
 
 ## Requirements *(mandatory)*
@@ -109,6 +117,7 @@ ### Functional Requirements
 
 - **FR-001**: The system MUST provide a single, centrally maintained enforcement mechanism that can be applied to tenant-scoped admin actions (including header actions, record actions, and bulk actions).
 - **FR-002**: For tenant-scoped actions, the system MUST enforce membership as deny-as-not-found: users not entitled to the tenant scope MUST receive 404 semantics for action execution.
+- **FR-002a**: For users not entitled to the tenant scope, the UI SHOULD NOT render tenant-scoped actions (default: hidden), while server-side execution MUST still enforce 404 semantics.
 - **FR-003**: For tenant members, the system MUST enforce capability denial as 403 when executing an action without permission.
 - **FR-004**: For tenant members lacking capability, the UI MUST render actions as visible-but-disabled and MUST show a standard tooltip explaining the missing permission.
 - **FR-005**: The enforcement mechanism MUST also enforce the same rules server-side (UI state is never sufficient).
@@ -119,7 +128,8 @@ ### Functional Requirements
   - 403 responses for insufficient capability without object details.
 - **FR-009**: v1 MUST include limited adoption by migrating 3–6 exemplar action surfaces to the new pattern to prove the approach.
 - **FR-010**: v1 MUST include regression tests that cover: non-member → 404, member without capability → disabled UI + 403 on execution, member with capability → allowed.
-- **FR-011**: v1 SHOULD include an automated guard that flags new ad-hoc authorization patterns in tenant-scoped admin UI code.
+- **FR-010a**: For bulk actions with mixed-permission records, the default behavior MUST be all-or-nothing (members see disabled + tooltip; execution denies with 403; non-members receive 404 semantics).
+- **FR-011**: v1 MUST include an automated, CI-failing guard that flags new ad-hoc authorization patterns in tenant-scoped admin UI code.
 - **FR-012**: The enforcement mechanism MUST avoid introducing avoidable performance regressions (no per-record membership lookups during render).
 - **FR-013**: The enforcement mechanism MUST NOT trigger outbound HTTP calls during render; it is DB-only.