b6343d5c3a
2 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| d1a9989037 |
feat/066-rbac-ui-enforcement-helper-v2 (#83)
Implementiert Feature 066: “RBAC UI Enforcement Helper v2” inkl. Migration der betroffenen Filament-Surfaces + Regression-Tests. Was ist drin Neuer Helper: UiEnforcement.php: mixed visibility (preserveVisibility, andVisibleWhen, andHiddenWhen), tenant resolver (tenantFromFilament, tenantFromRecord, tenantFrom(callable)), bulk preflight (preflightByCapability, preflightByTenantMembership, preflightSelection) + server-side authorizeOrAbort() / authorizeBulkSelectionOrAbort(). UiTooltips.php: standard Tooltip “Insufficient permission — ask a tenant Owner.” Filament migrations (weg von Gate::… / abort_* hin zu UiEnforcement): Backup/Restore (mixed visibility) TenantResource (record-scoped tenant actions + bulk preflight) Inventory/Entra/ProviderConnections (Tier-2 surfaces) Guardrails: NoAdHocFilamentAuthPatternsTest.php als CI-failing allowlist guard für app/Filament/**. Verhalten / Contract Non-member: deny-as-not-found (404) auf tenant routes; Actions hidden. Member ohne Capability: Action visible but disabled + standard tooltip; keine Ausführung. Member mit Capability: Action enabled; destructive/high-impact Actions bleiben confirmation-gated (->requiresConfirmation()). Server-side Enforcement bleibt vorhanden: Mutations/Operations rufen authorizeOrAbort() / authorizeBulkSelectionOrAbort(). Tests Neue/erweiterte Feature-Tests für RBAC UX inkl. Http::preventStrayRequests() (DB-only render): BackupSetUiEnforcementTest.php RestoreRunUiEnforcementTest.php ProviderConnectionsUiEnforcementTest.php diverse bestehende Filament Tests erweitert (Inventory/Entra/Tenant actions/bulk) Unit-Tests: UiEnforcementTest.php UiEnforcementBulkPreflightQueryCountTest.php Verification vendor/bin/sail bin pint --dirty ✅ vendor/bin/sail artisan test --compact tests/Unit/Auth tests/Feature/Filament tests/Feature/Guards tests/Feature/Rbac ✅ (185 passed, 5 skipped) Notes für Reviewer Filament v5 / Livewire v4 compliant. Destructive actions: weiterhin ->requiresConfirmation() + server-side auth. Bulk: authorization preflight ist set-based (Query-count test vorhanden). Co-authored-by: Ahmed Darrazi <ahmeddarrazi@MacBookPro.fritz.box> Reviewed-on: #83 |
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| d90fb0f963 |
065-tenant-rbac-v1 (#79)
PR Body Implements Spec 065 “Tenant RBAC v1” with capabilities-first RBAC, tenant membership scoping (Option 3), and consistent Filament action semantics. Key decisions / rules Tenancy Option 3: tenant switching is tenantless (ChooseTenant), tenant-scoped routes stay scoped, non-members get 404 (not 403). RBAC model: canonical capability registry + role→capability map + Gates for each capability (no role-string checks in UI logic). UX policy: for tenant members lacking permission → actions are visible but disabled + tooltip (avoid click→403). Security still enforced server-side. What’s included Capabilities foundation: Central capability registry (Capabilities::*) Role→capability mapping (RoleCapabilityMap) Gate registration + resolver/manager updates to support tenant-scoped authorization Filament enforcement hardening across the app: Tenant registration & tenant CRUD properly gated Backup/restore/policy flows aligned to “visible-but-disabled” where applicable Provider operations (health check / inventory sync / compliance snapshot) guarded and normalized Directory groups + inventory sync start surfaces normalized Policy version maintenance actions (archive/restore/prune/force delete) gated SpecKit artifacts for 065: spec.md, plan/tasks updates, checklists, enforcement hitlist Security guarantees Non-member → 404 via tenant scoping/membership guards. Member without capability → 403 on execution, even if UI is disabled. No destructive actions execute without proper authorization checks. Tests Adds/updates Pest coverage for: Tenant scoping & membership denial behavior Role matrix expectations (owner/manager/operator/readonly) Filament surface checks (visible/disabled actions, no side effects) Provider/Inventory/Groups run-start authorization Verified locally with targeted vendor/bin/sail artisan test --compact … Deployment / ops notes No new services required. Safe change: behavior is authorization + UI semantics; no breaking route changes intended. Co-authored-by: Ahmed Darrazi <ahmeddarrazi@MacBookPro.fritz.box> Reviewed-on: #79 |
