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# Specification Quality Checklist: Entra Sign-in (Tenant Panel) v1
**Purpose**: Validate specification completeness and quality before proceeding to planning
**Created**: 2026-01-26
**Feature**: [specs/063-entra-signin/spec.md](specs/063-entra-signin/spec.md)
## Content Quality
- [x] No implementation details (languages, frameworks, APIs)
- [x] Focused on user value and business needs
- [x] Written for non-technical stakeholders
- [x] All mandatory sections completed
## Requirement Completeness
- [x] No [NEEDS CLARIFICATION] markers remain
- [x] Requirements are testable and unambiguous
- [x] Success criteria are measurable
- [x] Success criteria are technology-agnostic (no implementation details)
- [x] All acceptance scenarios are defined
- [x] Edge cases are identified
- [x] Scope is clearly bounded
- [x] Dependencies and assumptions identified
## Feature Readiness
- [x] All functional requirements have clear acceptance criteria
- [x] User scenarios cover primary flows
- [x] Feature meets measurable outcomes defined in Success Criteria
- [x] No implementation details leak into specification
## Notes
- All validation checks passed. The specification is clear, complete, and ready for the planning phase.
- Three clarifications were incorporated: multi-tenant login flow, disabled user login behavior, and data model column sizing.

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# Feature Specification: 063 — Entra Sign-in (Tenant Panel) v1
**Feature Branch**: `063-entra-signin`
**Created**: 2026-01-26
**Status**: Draft (v1)
**Scope**: Tenant Admin panel (`/admin`) sign-in only
---
## Context / Goal
TenantAtlas needs a clean, enterprise-grade sign-in flow for the **Tenant Admin panel** (`/admin`) using **Microsoft Entra ID (OIDC)**.
This feature MUST:
- provide **Entra-only** login UX on `/admin/login`
- upsert tenant users safely keyed by `(entra_tenant_id, entra_object_id)`
- route users after login based on **tenant memberships**
- keep pages **DB-only at render time**
- log safely (no tokens/claims dumps)
This feature intentionally does **not** change platform/operator access (`/system`) or break-glass behavior; those belong to Feature **064-auth-structure**.
---
## Clarifications
### Session 2026-01-26
- Q: For a user belonging to multiple tenants, what should happen immediately after they sign in? → A: Redirect to a dedicated, full-screen "tenant chooser" page that lists all their memberships. The user must click one to proceed to the main dashboard.
- Q: If a user record exists in a disabled state (e.g., `deleted_at` is not null, or an `is_active` flag is false), and that user completes a valid Entra ID sign-in, what should happen? → A: Block the login. Redirect the user to the login page with a generic error message (e.g., "Your account is disabled. Please contact an administrator.").
- Q: What should be the maximum character length for the `users.entra_tenant_id` and `users.entra_object_id` columns in the database schema? → A: `VARCHAR(36)`. Both Entra Tenant IDs and Object IDs are GUIDs, which have a standard fixed length of 36 characters.
---
## Existing System Compatibility (important)
The repository already contains:
- A **System Panel** at `/system` using guard `platform` and `platform_users` (platform operator access).
- Break-glass recovery mechanics for platform operators (banner/middleware/routes).
- Tenant membership storage using a pivot table (`tenant_user` or equivalent) with role values via `TenantRole` enum.
**Compatibility constraints for 063**
- 063 MUST NOT modify `/system` panel, platform guards, platform users, or break-glass routes/UX.
- 063 MUST NOT refactor tenant RBAC data model or enforcement. It may only **read** memberships to decide where to redirect after login.
- 063 MUST NOT introduce Graph calls (or any outbound HTTP) during render/poll/hydration of `/admin` pages.
---
## Non-Goals (explicit)
- No Platform Operator `/system` login implementation (already exists or handled elsewhere).
- No break-glass UX on `/admin/login`.
- No tenant RBAC redesign or role enforcement changes (assume memberships already exist).
- No Graph calls or remote work in login render/poll/hydration.
- No storing of Entra access/refresh tokens.
- No queue/worker dependence for login (login is synchronous request/response).
---
## User Scenarios & Testing (mandatory)
### User Story 1 — Entra-only login UI on `/admin/login` (Priority: P1)
A tenant user can only start Microsoft sign-in from `/admin/login`.
**Acceptance Scenarios**
1. Given I open `/admin/login`, then I see only “Sign in with Microsoft” and no email/password fields.
2. Given Entra config is missing/invalid, `/admin/login` still renders and shows a generic message (no secrets).
**Independent Test**
- Render `/admin/login` and assert no password inputs exist.
---
### User Story 2 — OIDC callback upserts tenant identity safely (Priority: P1)
The callback upserts a tenant user using Entra claims.
**Acceptance Scenarios**
1. Given Entra callback includes `tid` and `oid`, when sign-in completes, then `users` is upserted keyed by:
- `entra_tenant_id = tid`
- `entra_object_id = oid`
2. Given sign-in succeeds, then the session is regenerated.
3. Given callback is missing `tid` or `oid`, then redirect to `/admin/login` with a generic error.
4. Given a user exists but is disabled (soft-deleted), when they complete a valid sign-in, then they are redirected to /admin/login with a generic error.
**Independent Test**
- Fake a callback payload and assert `(tid, oid)` uniqueness is enforced.
---
### User Story 3 — Post-login routing is membership-based (Priority: P1)
After login, routing depends on Suite tenant memberships.
**Acceptance Scenarios**
1. Given I have 0 memberships, then redirect to `/admin/no-access`.
2. Given I have exactly 1 membership, then redirect into that tenant’s dashboard.
3. Given I have >1 memberships, then redirect to a dedicated, full-screen tenant chooser page.
**Independent Test**
- Seed memberships and assert each redirect path.
---
### User Story 4 — Filament-native “No access” page (Priority: P2)
Users without memberships get a safe, Filament-native page.
**Acceptance Scenarios**
1. Given I have 0 memberships, `/admin/no-access` renders using Filament UI (no raw HTML pages).
2. The page does not leak internal details; it provides next steps (“Ask an admin to add you”).
---
## Requirements (mandatory)
### Functional Requirements
- **FR-001**: `/admin/login` MUST be Entra-only (no password login form).
- **FR-002**: Tenant user upsert MUST be keyed by `(entra_tenant_id, entra_object_id)` and MUST NOT store Entra access/refresh tokens.
- **FR-003**: Post-login routing MUST be based on memberships:
- 0 → `/admin/no-access`
- 1 → tenant dashboard
- N → dedicated tenant chooser page
- **FR-004**: OIDC failures MUST be handled safely:
- redirect to `/admin/login` with generic error
- log stable `reason_code` + `correlation_id`
- never log token/claims payloads
- **FR-005**: Logging MUST be privacy-safe:
- success: minimal (user_id, tid, oid hash, timestamp, correlation_id)
- failure: `reason_code`, correlation_id, minimal diagnostics
- **FR-006**: `/admin/login` and `/admin/no-access` MUST be DB-only at render time (no outbound HTTP).
- **FR-007**: 063 MUST NOT surface break-glass links or platform login UX on `/admin/login`.
- **FR-008**: Session separation MUST prevent implicit crossover:
- a tenant session MUST NOT grant access to `/system`
- a platform session MUST NOT grant access to `/admin` tenant membership routes
(Implementation is via separate guards/panels; 063 only asserts behavior via tests.)
- **FR-009**: Login flow MUST NOT require queue workers; it must complete synchronously.
- **FR-010**: If a user record exists but is in a disabled or soft-deleted state, a successful Entra ID authentication MUST be blocked, and the user redirected to the login page with a generic error.
### Non-Functional Requirements (NFR)
- **NFR-01 (Security)**: Do not persist secrets/tokens. Sanitize all error output and logs.
- **NFR-02 (Stability)**: Callback is idempotent; safe to retry without creating duplicates.
- **NFR-03 (Performance)**: Callback returns within ~2s under normal conditions.
- **NFR-04 (Maintainability)**: Minimal diff; do not refactor membership/RBAC models.
---
## Data Model
Uses existing `users` table. Required columns:
- `entra_tenant_id` (string)
- `entra_object_id` (string)
- `name` (string)
- `email` (nullable)
**Index**
- Unique index on `(entra_tenant_id, entra_object_id)`.
Optional (if already present / needed later):
- `last_tenant_id` (nullable FK to `tenants.id`) to optimize redirect for multi-membership users.
No new tables required.
---
## Routes / UI Surfaces
- `/admin/login` — Filament login override (Entra-only CTA)
- `/auth/entra/redirect` — starts OIDC redirect (Socialite)
- `/auth/entra/callback` — handles callback, upsert, routing
- `/admin/no-access` — Filament page for 0-membership users
- `/admin/choose-tenant` — Filament page for N-membership users to select a tenant
---
## OIDC Handling & Failure Semantics
### Claims requirements
- `tid` (tenant id) MUST be present.
- `oid` (object id) MUST be present.
If missing → fail safely.
### Generic user-facing error
- “Authentication failed. Please try again.”
### Server-side logging
Log event `auth.entra.login` with:
- `success`: boolean
- `reason_code`: string (on failure)
- `user_id`: (on success)
- `entra_tenant_id`: tid (or hashed)
- `entra_object_id_hash`: hash(oid)
- `correlation_id`: request id or session id
- `timestamp`
### Reason code examples (stable)
- `oidc_missing_claims`
- `oidc_invalid_state`
- `oidc_user_denied`
- `oidc_provider_unavailable`
- `oidc_user_upsert_failed`
- `user_disabled`
---
## Implementation Guardrails (hard)
- Do not implement a password login form for `/admin`.
- Do not call `$this->form->fill()` with default creds.
- Do not show break-glass link/button on `/admin/login`.
- Do not modify `/system` panel, platform guards, or break-glass logic.
- Do not refactor `User::tenants()` or membership schema; use a small resolver/service to decide redirect.
- Do not make outbound HTTP during render/poll/hydration of `/admin` pages.
- Do not store raw claims or tokens.
---
## Acceptance Tests (required)
### Feature tests (Pest)
1. **AdminLoginIsEntraOnlyTest**
- GET `/admin/login` contains Microsoft CTA
- asserts no `password` input / no local login form
2. **EntraCallbackUpsertByTidOidTest**
- callback upserts user by `(tid, oid)` (unique)
- session is regenerated
3. **PostLoginRoutingByMembershipTest**
- 0 memberships → `/admin/no-access`
- 1 membership → tenant dashboard
- N memberships → chooser page
4. **OidcFailureRedirectsSafelyTest**
- missing tid/oid → redirect `/admin/login`
- logs contain `reason_code` + `correlation_id`
- logs do not contain tokens/claims dumps
5. **SessionSeparationSmokeTest**
- tenant session cannot access `/system`
- platform session cannot access tenant membership routes without membership
6. **DisabledUserLoginIsBlockedTest**
- Seed a disabled/soft-deleted user
- Fake a successful OIDC callback for that user
- Assert redirect to /admin/login
- Assert log contains `reason_code: user_disabled`
### Quality gate
- `./vendor/bin/sail php ./vendor/bin/pint --dirty`
- `./vendor/bin/sail artisan test tests/Feature/Auth --stop-on-failure`
---
## Manual Verification Checklist
1. Open `/admin/login` - only Microsoft sign-in CTA visible
2. Complete Entra sign-in - user record exists with tid/oid
3. 0 memberships → `/admin/no-access`
4. 1 membership → tenant dashboard
5. >1 memberships → chooser page
6. Verify logs:
- failures show reason_code + correlation_id
- no tokens/claims in logs
---
## Out of Scope / Follow-ups
- **064-auth-structure**: `/system` operator login hardening, break-glass UX, panel separation governance.
- **062-tenant-rbac-v1**: role enforcement audit + resource-by-resource authorization hardening.
- Advanced Entra topics (v2+): delegated flows, refresh token storage, certificate auth, conditional access UI.