specs/066-rbac-ui-enforcement-helper/checklists/requirements.md

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+# Specification Quality Checklist: RBAC UI Enforcement Helper v1
+
+**Purpose**: Validate specification completeness and quality before proceeding to planning
+**Created**: 2026-01-28
+**Feature**: [specs/066-rbac-ui-enforcement-helper/spec.md](../spec.md)
+
+## Content Quality
+
+- [x] No implementation details (languages, frameworks, APIs)
+- [x] Focused on user value and business needs
+- [x] Written for non-technical stakeholders
+- [x] All mandatory sections completed
+
+## Requirement Completeness
+
+- [x] No [NEEDS CLARIFICATION] markers remain
+- [x] Requirements are testable and unambiguous
+- [x] Success criteria are measurable
+- [x] Success criteria are technology-agnostic (no implementation details)
+- [x] All acceptance scenarios are defined
+- [x] Edge cases are identified
+- [x] Scope is clearly bounded
+- [x] Dependencies and assumptions identified
+
+## Feature Readiness
+
+- [x] All functional requirements have clear acceptance criteria
+- [x] User scenarios cover primary flows
+- [x] Feature meets measurable outcomes defined in Success Criteria
+- [x] No implementation details leak into specification
+
+## Notes
+
+- No blockers found in this iteration.

specs/066-rbac-ui-enforcement-helper/spec.md

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+# Feature Specification: RBAC UI Enforcement Helper v1
+
+**Feature Branch**: `066-rbac-ui-enforcement-helper`  
+**Created**: 2026-01-28  
+**Status**: Draft  
+**Input**: Provide a suite-wide, consistent way to enforce tenant RBAC for admin UI actions (buttons/actions in lists, records, and bulk actions) without copy/paste authorization logic.
+
+## User Scenarios & Testing *(mandatory)*
+
+<!--
+  IMPORTANT: User stories should be PRIORITIZED as user journeys ordered by importance.
+  Each user story/journey must be INDEPENDENTLY TESTABLE - meaning if you implement just ONE of them,
+  you should still have a viable MVP (Minimum Viable Product) that delivers value.
+  
+  Assign priorities (P1, P2, P3, etc.) to each story, where P1 is the most critical.
+  Think of each story as a standalone slice of functionality that can be:
+  - Developed independently
+  - Tested independently
+  - Deployed independently
+  - Demonstrated to users independently
+-->
+
+### User Story 1 - Tenant member sees consistent disabled UX (Priority: P1)
+
+As a tenant member, I can clearly see which actions exist, and when I lack permission the action is visible but disabled with an explanatory tooltip.
+
+**Why this priority**: Prevents confusion and reduces support load while keeping the UI predictable for members.
+
+**Independent Test**: Can be tested by visiting a tenant-scoped admin page as a member with insufficient permissions and verifying the action is disabled, shows the standard tooltip, and cannot be executed.
+
+**Acceptance Scenarios**:
+
+1. **Given** a tenant member without the required capability, **When** they view an action on a tenant-scoped page, **Then** the action is visible but disabled and shows the standard “insufficient permission” tooltip.
+2. **Given** a tenant member without the required capability, **When** they attempt to execute the action (including direct invocation, bypassing the UI), **Then** the server rejects with 403.
+
+---
+
+### User Story 2 - Non-members cannot infer tenant resources (Priority: P2)
+
+As a non-member of a tenant, I cannot discover tenant-scoped resources or actions; the system responds as “not found”.
+
+**Why this priority**: Prevents tenant enumeration and cross-tenant information leakage.
+
+**Independent Test**: Can be tested by attempting to access tenant-scoped pages/actions as a user without membership and verifying 404 behavior.
+
+**Acceptance Scenarios**:
+
+1. **Given** a user who is not entitled to the tenant scope, **When** they attempt any tenant-scoped page or action, **Then** the system responds as 404 (deny-as-not-found).
+
+---
+
+### User Story 3 - Maintainers add actions safely by default (Priority: P3)
+
+As a maintainer, I can add new tenant-scoped actions using one standard pattern, and regression guards prevent introducing ad-hoc authorization logic.
+
+**Why this priority**: Reduces RBAC regressions as the app grows and makes reviews easier.
+
+**Independent Test**: Can be tested by introducing a sample ad-hoc authorization pattern and confirming automated checks/tests flag it.
+
+**Acceptance Scenarios**:
+
+1. **Given** a maintainer adds a new tenant-scoped action, **When** they use the central enforcement helper, **Then** member/non-member semantics and tooltip behavior match the standard without additional per-page customization.
+2. **Given** a maintainer introduces a new ad-hoc authorization mapping in tenant-scoped admin UI code, **When** automated checks run, **Then** the change is flagged to prevent drift.
+
+---
+
+[Add more user stories as needed, each with an assigned priority]
+
+### Edge Cases
+
+<!--
+  ACTION REQUIRED: The content in this section represents placeholders.
+  Fill them out with the right edge cases.
+-->
+
+- Membership is revoked while the user has the page open (execution must still enforce 404 semantics).
+- Capability changes mid-session (UI may be stale; server enforcement remains correct).
+- Bulk actions with mixed-permission records (the safe default behavior is enforced consistently).
+- Target record is deleted/archived between render and execution (no information leakage in errors).
+
+## Requirements *(mandatory)*
+
+**Constitution alignment (required):** If this feature introduces any Microsoft Graph calls, any write/change behavior,
+or any long-running/queued/scheduled work, the spec MUST describe contract registry updates, safety gates
+(preview/confirmation/audit), tenant isolation, run observability (`OperationRun` type/identity/visibility), and tests.
+If security-relevant DB-only actions intentionally skip `OperationRun`, the spec MUST describe `AuditLog` entries.
+
+**Constitution alignment (RBAC-UX):** This feature defines a default pattern for tenant-plane admin actions. The implementation MUST:
+- enforce membership as an isolation boundary (non-member / not entitled → 404 deny-as-not-found),
+- enforce capability denials as 403 (after membership is established),
+- keep actions visible-but-disabled with a standard tooltip for members lacking capability (except allowed sensitive exceptions),
+- enforce authorization server-side for every mutation/operation-start/credential change,
+- use the canonical capability registry (no raw capability string literals),
+- ensure destructive-like actions require confirmation,
+- ship regression tests and a guard against new ad-hoc authorization patterns.
+
+**Constitution alignment (OPS-EX-AUTH-001):** OIDC/SAML login handshakes may perform synchronous outbound HTTP (e.g., token exchange)
+on `/auth/*` endpoints without an `OperationRun`. This MUST NOT be used for Monitoring/Operations pages.
+
+**Constitution alignment (BADGE-001):** If this feature changes status-like badges (status/outcome/severity/risk/availability/boolean),
+the spec MUST describe how badge semantics stay centralized (no ad-hoc mappings) and which tests cover any new/changed values.
+
+<!--
+  ACTION REQUIRED: The content in this section represents placeholders.
+  Fill them out with the right functional requirements.
+-->
+
+### Functional Requirements
+
+- **FR-001**: The system MUST provide a single, centrally maintained enforcement mechanism that can be applied to tenant-scoped admin actions (including header actions, record actions, and bulk actions).
+- **FR-002**: For tenant-scoped actions, the system MUST enforce membership as deny-as-not-found: users not entitled to the tenant scope MUST receive 404 semantics for action execution.
+- **FR-003**: For tenant members, the system MUST enforce capability denial as 403 when executing an action without permission.
+- **FR-004**: For tenant members lacking capability, the UI MUST render actions as visible-but-disabled and MUST show a standard tooltip explaining the missing permission.
+- **FR-005**: The enforcement mechanism MUST also enforce the same rules server-side (UI state is never sufficient).
+- **FR-006**: The enforcement mechanism MUST be capability-first and MUST reference capabilities only via the canonical capability registry (no ad-hoc string literals).
+- **FR-007**: The enforcement mechanism MUST provide a standard confirmation behavior for destructive-like actions, including a clear warning message.
+- **FR-008**: The system MUST provide standardized, non-leaky error and tooltip messages:
+  - 404 semantics for non-members without hints.
+  - 403 responses for insufficient capability without object details.
+- **FR-009**: v1 MUST include limited adoption by migrating 3–6 exemplar action surfaces to the new pattern to prove the approach.
+- **FR-010**: v1 MUST include regression tests that cover: non-member → 404, member without capability → disabled UI + 403 on execution, member with capability → allowed.
+- **FR-011**: v1 SHOULD include an automated guard that flags new ad-hoc authorization patterns in tenant-scoped admin UI code.
+- **FR-012**: The enforcement mechanism MUST avoid introducing avoidable performance regressions (no per-record membership lookups during render).
+- **FR-013**: The enforcement mechanism MUST NOT trigger outbound HTTP calls during render; it is DB-only.
+
+### Key Entities *(include if feature involves data)*
+
+- **Tenant**: The isolation boundary for all tenant-scoped UI and actions.
+- **User**: The authenticated actor attempting to view or execute actions.
+- **Membership**: Whether a user is entitled to a tenant scope.
+- **Capability**: A named permission from the canonical capability registry.
+- **Action**: A discrete operation exposed in the tenant-scoped admin interface.
+
+### Assumptions
+
+- Default tooltip language is English (i18n may be added later).
+- Non-destructive bulk actions are in scope for v1; destructive bulk actions may be supported but are not required for v1 completion.
+- Global search tenant scoping is out of scope for this spec (covered by separate work), but this feature must not introduce new leaks.
+
+## Success Criteria *(mandatory)*
+
+<!--
+  ACTION REQUIRED: Define measurable success criteria.
+  These must be technology-agnostic and measurable.
+-->
+
+### Measurable Outcomes
+
+- **SC-001**: For all migrated tenant-scoped action surfaces, 100% of non-member execution attempts are denied with 404 semantics (verified by automated tests).
+- **SC-002**: For all migrated tenant-scoped action surfaces, 100% of member-but-unauthorized execution attempts are denied with 403 (verified by automated tests).
+- **SC-003**: For all migrated tenant-scoped action surfaces, members lacking capability see the action visible-but-disabled with the standard tooltip (verified by automated tests and/or UI assertions).
+- **SC-004**: At least one automated guard exists that flags newly introduced ad-hoc authorization patterns in tenant-scoped admin UI code.
+- **SC-005**: v1 demonstrates adoption by migrating 3–6 exemplar action surfaces, reducing duplicate authorization wiring in those areas.