## Summary - introduce the Provider Connection Filament resource (list/create/edit) with DB-only controls, grouped action dropdowns, and badge-driven status/health rendering - wire up the provider foundation stack (migrations, models, policies, providers, operations, badges, and audits) plus the required spec docs/checklists - standardize Inventory Sync notifications so the job no longer writes its own DB rows; terminal notifications now flow exclusively through OperationRunCompleted while the start surface still shows the queued toast ## Testing - ./vendor/bin/sail php ./vendor/bin/pint --dirty - ./vendor/bin/sail artisan test tests/Unit/Badges/ProviderConnectionBadgesTest.php - ./vendor/bin/sail artisan test tests/Feature/ProviderConnections tests/Feature/Filament/ProviderConnectionsDbOnlyTest.php - ./vendor/bin/sail artisan test tests/Feature/Inventory/RunInventorySyncJobTest.php tests/Feature/Inventory/InventorySyncStartSurfaceTest.php Co-authored-by: Ahmed Darrazi <ahmeddarrazi@MacBookPro.fritz.box> Reviewed-on: #73
129 lines
4.9 KiB
PHP
129 lines
4.9 KiB
PHP
<?php
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namespace App\Support\OpsUx;
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final class RunFailureSanitizer
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{
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public const string REASON_GRAPH_THROTTLED = 'graph_throttled';
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public const string REASON_GRAPH_TIMEOUT = 'graph_timeout';
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public const string REASON_PERMISSION_DENIED = 'permission_denied';
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public const string REASON_PROVIDER_AUTH_FAILED = 'provider_auth_failed';
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public const string REASON_PROVIDER_OUTAGE = 'provider_outage';
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public const string REASON_VALIDATION_ERROR = 'validation_error';
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public const string REASON_CONFLICT_DETECTED = 'conflict_detected';
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public const string REASON_UNKNOWN_ERROR = 'unknown_error';
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public static function sanitizeCode(string $code): string
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{
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$code = strtolower(trim($code));
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if ($code === '') {
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return 'unknown';
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}
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return substr($code, 0, 80);
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}
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public static function normalizeReasonCode(string $candidate): string
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{
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$candidate = strtolower(trim($candidate));
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if ($candidate === '') {
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return self::REASON_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
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}
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$allowed = [
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self::REASON_GRAPH_THROTTLED,
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self::REASON_GRAPH_TIMEOUT,
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self::REASON_PERMISSION_DENIED,
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self::REASON_PROVIDER_AUTH_FAILED,
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self::REASON_PROVIDER_OUTAGE,
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self::REASON_VALIDATION_ERROR,
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self::REASON_CONFLICT_DETECTED,
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self::REASON_UNKNOWN_ERROR,
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];
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if (in_array($candidate, $allowed, true)) {
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return $candidate;
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}
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// Compatibility mappings from existing codebase labels.
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$candidate = match ($candidate) {
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'graph_forbidden' => self::REASON_PERMISSION_DENIED,
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'graph_transient' => self::REASON_GRAPH_TIMEOUT,
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'unknown' => self::REASON_UNKNOWN_ERROR,
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default => $candidate,
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};
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if (in_array($candidate, $allowed, true)) {
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return $candidate;
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}
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// Heuristic normalization for ad-hoc codes used across jobs/services.
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if (str_contains($candidate, 'throttle') || str_contains($candidate, '429')) {
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return self::REASON_GRAPH_THROTTLED;
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}
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if (str_contains($candidate, 'invalid_client') || str_contains($candidate, 'invalid_grant') || str_contains($candidate, '401') || str_contains($candidate, 'aadsts')) {
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return self::REASON_PROVIDER_AUTH_FAILED;
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}
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if (str_contains($candidate, 'timeout') || str_contains($candidate, 'transient') || str_contains($candidate, '503') || str_contains($candidate, '504')) {
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return self::REASON_GRAPH_TIMEOUT;
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}
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if (str_contains($candidate, 'outage') || str_contains($candidate, '500') || str_contains($candidate, '502') || str_contains($candidate, 'bad_gateway')) {
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return self::REASON_PROVIDER_OUTAGE;
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}
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if (str_contains($candidate, 'forbidden') || str_contains($candidate, 'permission') || str_contains($candidate, 'unauthorized') || str_contains($candidate, '403')) {
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return self::REASON_PERMISSION_DENIED;
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}
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if (str_contains($candidate, 'validation') || str_contains($candidate, 'not_found') || str_contains($candidate, 'bad_request') || str_contains($candidate, '400') || str_contains($candidate, '422')) {
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return self::REASON_VALIDATION_ERROR;
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}
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if (str_contains($candidate, 'conflict') || str_contains($candidate, '409')) {
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return self::REASON_CONFLICT_DETECTED;
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}
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return self::REASON_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
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}
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public static function sanitizeMessage(string $message): string
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{
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$message = trim(str_replace(["\r", "\n"], ' ', $message));
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// Redact obvious PII (emails).
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$message = preg_replace('/[A-Z0-9._%+\-]+@[A-Z0-9.\-]+\.[A-Z]{2,}/i', '[REDACTED_EMAIL]', $message) ?? $message;
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// Redact obvious auth headers.
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$message = preg_replace('/\bAuthorization\s*:\s*[^\s]+(?:\s+[^\s]+)?/i', '[REDACTED_AUTH]', $message) ?? $message;
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$message = preg_replace('/\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9\-\._~\+\/]+=*\b/i', '[REDACTED_AUTH]', $message) ?? $message;
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// Redact common secret-like key/value patterns.
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$message = preg_replace('/\b(access_token|refresh_token|client_secret|password)\b\s*[:=]\s*[^\s,;]+/i', '[REDACTED_SECRET]', $message) ?? $message;
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$message = preg_replace('/"(access_token|refresh_token|client_secret|password)"\s*:\s*"[^"]*"/i', '"[REDACTED]":"[REDACTED]"', $message) ?? $message;
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// Redact long opaque blobs that look token-like.
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$message = preg_replace('/\b[A-Za-z0-9\-\._~\+\/]{64,}\b/', '[REDACTED]', $message) ?? $message;
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// Ensure forbidden substrings never leak into stored messages.
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$message = str_ireplace(
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['client_secret', 'access_token', 'refresh_token', 'authorization', 'bearer '],
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'[REDACTED]',
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$message,
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);
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return substr($message, 0, 120);
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}
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}
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