PR Body Implements Spec 065 “Tenant RBAC v1” with capabilities-first RBAC, tenant membership scoping (Option 3), and consistent Filament action semantics. Key decisions / rules Tenancy Option 3: tenant switching is tenantless (ChooseTenant), tenant-scoped routes stay scoped, non-members get 404 (not 403). RBAC model: canonical capability registry + role→capability map + Gates for each capability (no role-string checks in UI logic). UX policy: for tenant members lacking permission → actions are visible but disabled + tooltip (avoid click→403). Security still enforced server-side. What’s included Capabilities foundation: Central capability registry (Capabilities::*) Role→capability mapping (RoleCapabilityMap) Gate registration + resolver/manager updates to support tenant-scoped authorization Filament enforcement hardening across the app: Tenant registration & tenant CRUD properly gated Backup/restore/policy flows aligned to “visible-but-disabled” where applicable Provider operations (health check / inventory sync / compliance snapshot) guarded and normalized Directory groups + inventory sync start surfaces normalized Policy version maintenance actions (archive/restore/prune/force delete) gated SpecKit artifacts for 065: spec.md, plan/tasks updates, checklists, enforcement hitlist Security guarantees Non-member → 404 via tenant scoping/membership guards. Member without capability → 403 on execution, even if UI is disabled. No destructive actions execute without proper authorization checks. Tests Adds/updates Pest coverage for: Tenant scoping & membership denial behavior Role matrix expectations (owner/manager/operator/readonly) Filament surface checks (visible/disabled actions, no side effects) Provider/Inventory/Groups run-start authorization Verified locally with targeted vendor/bin/sail artisan test --compact … Deployment / ops notes No new services required. Safe change: behavior is authorization + UI semantics; no breaking route changes intended. Co-authored-by: Ahmed Darrazi <ahmeddarrazi@MacBookPro.fritz.box> Reviewed-on: #79
53 lines
1.8 KiB
PHP
53 lines
1.8 KiB
PHP
<?php
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use App\Models\AuditLog;
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use App\Models\User;
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use App\Services\Auth\TenantMembershipManager;
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use Illuminate\Foundation\Testing\RefreshDatabase;
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uses(RefreshDatabase::class);
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it('writes audit logs for membership add, role change, and remove without sensitive fields', function () {
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[$actor, $tenant] = createUserWithTenant(role: 'owner');
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$member = User::factory()->create();
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$manager = app(TenantMembershipManager::class);
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$membership = $manager->addMember($tenant, $actor, $member, 'readonly');
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$manager->changeRole($tenant, $actor, $membership, 'operator');
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$manager->removeMember($tenant, $actor, $membership);
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$actions = AuditLog::query()
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->where('tenant_id', $tenant->getKey())
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->whereIn('action', [
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'tenant_membership.add',
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'tenant_membership.role_change',
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'tenant_membership.remove',
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])
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->pluck('action')
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->all();
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expect($actions)->toContain('tenant_membership.add');
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expect($actions)->toContain('tenant_membership.role_change');
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expect($actions)->toContain('tenant_membership.remove');
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$metadata = AuditLog::query()
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->where('tenant_id', $tenant->getKey())
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->whereIn('action', [
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'tenant_membership.add',
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'tenant_membership.role_change',
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'tenant_membership.remove',
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])
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->get()
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->pluck('metadata')
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->all();
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foreach ($metadata as $entry) {
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expect($entry)->toBeArray();
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expect(array_key_exists('app_client_secret', $entry))->toBeFalse();
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expect(array_key_exists('client_secret', $entry))->toBeFalse();
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expect(array_key_exists('refresh_token', $entry))->toBeFalse();
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expect(array_key_exists('access_token', $entry))->toBeFalse();
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}
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});
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