TenantAtlas/tests/Feature/TenantRBAC/MembershipAuditLogTest.php
ahmido d90fb0f963 065-tenant-rbac-v1 (#79)
PR Body
Implements Spec 065 “Tenant RBAC v1” with capabilities-first RBAC, tenant membership scoping (Option 3), and consistent Filament action semantics.

Key decisions / rules

Tenancy Option 3: tenant switching is tenantless (ChooseTenant), tenant-scoped routes stay scoped, non-members get 404 (not 403).
RBAC model: canonical capability registry + role→capability map + Gates for each capability (no role-string checks in UI logic).
UX policy: for tenant members lacking permission → actions are visible but disabled + tooltip (avoid click→403).
Security still enforced server-side.
What’s included

Capabilities foundation:
Central capability registry (Capabilities::*)
Role→capability mapping (RoleCapabilityMap)
Gate registration + resolver/manager updates to support tenant-scoped authorization
Filament enforcement hardening across the app:
Tenant registration & tenant CRUD properly gated
Backup/restore/policy flows aligned to “visible-but-disabled” where applicable
Provider operations (health check / inventory sync / compliance snapshot) guarded and normalized
Directory groups + inventory sync start surfaces normalized
Policy version maintenance actions (archive/restore/prune/force delete) gated
SpecKit artifacts for 065:
spec.md, plan/tasks updates, checklists, enforcement hitlist
Security guarantees

Non-member → 404 via tenant scoping/membership guards.
Member without capability → 403 on execution, even if UI is disabled.
No destructive actions execute without proper authorization checks.
Tests

Adds/updates Pest coverage for:
Tenant scoping & membership denial behavior
Role matrix expectations (owner/manager/operator/readonly)
Filament surface checks (visible/disabled actions, no side effects)
Provider/Inventory/Groups run-start authorization
Verified locally with targeted vendor/bin/sail artisan test --compact …
Deployment / ops notes

No new services required.
Safe change: behavior is authorization + UI semantics; no breaking route changes intended.

Co-authored-by: Ahmed Darrazi <ahmeddarrazi@MacBookPro.fritz.box>
Reviewed-on: #79
2026-01-28 21:09:47 +00:00

53 lines
1.8 KiB
PHP

<?php
use App\Models\AuditLog;
use App\Models\User;
use App\Services\Auth\TenantMembershipManager;
use Illuminate\Foundation\Testing\RefreshDatabase;
uses(RefreshDatabase::class);
it('writes audit logs for membership add, role change, and remove without sensitive fields', function () {
[$actor, $tenant] = createUserWithTenant(role: 'owner');
$member = User::factory()->create();
$manager = app(TenantMembershipManager::class);
$membership = $manager->addMember($tenant, $actor, $member, 'readonly');
$manager->changeRole($tenant, $actor, $membership, 'operator');
$manager->removeMember($tenant, $actor, $membership);
$actions = AuditLog::query()
->where('tenant_id', $tenant->getKey())
->whereIn('action', [
'tenant_membership.add',
'tenant_membership.role_change',
'tenant_membership.remove',
])
->pluck('action')
->all();
expect($actions)->toContain('tenant_membership.add');
expect($actions)->toContain('tenant_membership.role_change');
expect($actions)->toContain('tenant_membership.remove');
$metadata = AuditLog::query()
->where('tenant_id', $tenant->getKey())
->whereIn('action', [
'tenant_membership.add',
'tenant_membership.role_change',
'tenant_membership.remove',
])
->get()
->pluck('metadata')
->all();
foreach ($metadata as $entry) {
expect($entry)->toBeArray();
expect(array_key_exists('app_client_secret', $entry))->toBeFalse();
expect(array_key_exists('client_secret', $entry))->toBeFalse();
expect(array_key_exists('refresh_token', $entry))->toBeFalse();
expect(array_key_exists('access_token', $entry))->toBeFalse();
}
});