PR Body Implements Spec 065 “Tenant RBAC v1” with capabilities-first RBAC, tenant membership scoping (Option 3), and consistent Filament action semantics. Key decisions / rules Tenancy Option 3: tenant switching is tenantless (ChooseTenant), tenant-scoped routes stay scoped, non-members get 404 (not 403). RBAC model: canonical capability registry + role→capability map + Gates for each capability (no role-string checks in UI logic). UX policy: for tenant members lacking permission → actions are visible but disabled + tooltip (avoid click→403). Security still enforced server-side. What’s included Capabilities foundation: Central capability registry (Capabilities::*) Role→capability mapping (RoleCapabilityMap) Gate registration + resolver/manager updates to support tenant-scoped authorization Filament enforcement hardening across the app: Tenant registration & tenant CRUD properly gated Backup/restore/policy flows aligned to “visible-but-disabled” where applicable Provider operations (health check / inventory sync / compliance snapshot) guarded and normalized Directory groups + inventory sync start surfaces normalized Policy version maintenance actions (archive/restore/prune/force delete) gated SpecKit artifacts for 065: spec.md, plan/tasks updates, checklists, enforcement hitlist Security guarantees Non-member → 404 via tenant scoping/membership guards. Member without capability → 403 on execution, even if UI is disabled. No destructive actions execute without proper authorization checks. Tests Adds/updates Pest coverage for: Tenant scoping & membership denial behavior Role matrix expectations (owner/manager/operator/readonly) Filament surface checks (visible/disabled actions, no side effects) Provider/Inventory/Groups run-start authorization Verified locally with targeted vendor/bin/sail artisan test --compact … Deployment / ops notes No new services required. Safe change: behavior is authorization + UI semantics; no breaking route changes intended. Co-authored-by: Ahmed Darrazi <ahmeddarrazi@MacBookPro.fritz.box> Reviewed-on: #79
63 lines
1.9 KiB
PHP
63 lines
1.9 KiB
PHP
<?php
|
|
|
|
use Illuminate\Filesystem\Filesystem;
|
|
|
|
it('does not use role-string checks outside the RBAC core', function () {
|
|
/**
|
|
* This guard test is intentionally narrow:
|
|
* - It targets comparisons / branching on role strings (authorization-by-role patterns).
|
|
* - It does NOT forbid role literals used as data values (e.g., form options, seed data).
|
|
*/
|
|
$allowedFiles = collect([
|
|
app_path('Services/Auth/RoleCapabilityMap.php'),
|
|
app_path('Services/Auth/TenantMembershipManager.php'),
|
|
])->map(fn (string $path) => realpath($path) ?: $path)->all();
|
|
|
|
$roleValuePattern = '(owner|manager|operator|readonly)';
|
|
|
|
$patterns = [
|
|
// $membership->role === 'owner' / !== 'owner'
|
|
'/->role\s*(===|==|!==|!=)\s*[\"\']?'.$roleValuePattern.'[\"\']?/i',
|
|
|
|
// $role === 'owner'
|
|
'/\$role\s*(===|==|!==|!=)\s*[\"\']?'.$roleValuePattern.'[\"\']?/i',
|
|
|
|
// case 'owner':
|
|
'/\bcase\s*[\"\']?'.$roleValuePattern.'[\"\']?\s*:/i',
|
|
|
|
// match (...) { 'owner' => ... }
|
|
'/\bmatch\b[\s\S]*?\{[\s\S]*?[\"\']?'.$roleValuePattern.'[\"\']?\s*=>/i',
|
|
];
|
|
|
|
$filesystem = new Filesystem;
|
|
|
|
$violations = [];
|
|
|
|
foreach ($filesystem->allFiles(app_path()) as $file) {
|
|
$path = $file->getRealPath();
|
|
|
|
if ($path === false) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (in_array($path, $allowedFiles, true)) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
$contents = $filesystem->get($path);
|
|
|
|
foreach ($patterns as $pattern) {
|
|
if (preg_match($pattern, $contents) === 1) {
|
|
$violations[] = $path;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ($violations !== []) {
|
|
throw new RuntimeException('Role-string checks must live in RoleCapabilityMap / TenantMembershipManager only. Offenders: '.implode(', ', $violations));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
expect($violations)->toBeEmpty();
|
|
});
|