TenantAtlas/.specify/memory/constitution.md

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Sync Impact Report

- Version change: 1.5.0 → 1.6.0
- Modified principles:
  - Tenant Isolation is Non-negotiable (clarified 404 vs 403 semantics)
  - RBAC guidance consolidated (RBAC model rules merged into RBAC-UX)
- Added sections:
  - RBAC & UI Enforcement Standards (RBAC-UX)
- Removed sections: None (RBAC-001..009 content consolidated into RBAC-UX)
- Templates requiring updates:
  - ✅ .specify/templates/plan-template.md
  - ✅ .specify/templates/spec-template.md
  - ✅ .specify/templates/tasks-template.md
  - N/A: .specify/templates/commands/ (directory not present in this repo)
- Follow-up TODOs: None
-->

# TenantPilot Constitution

## Core Principles

### Inventory-first, Snapshots-second
- All modules MUST operate primarily on Inventory as “last observed” state.
- Inventory is the source of truth for what TenantPilot last observed; Microsoft Intune remains the external truth.
- Snapshots/Backups MUST be explicit actions (manual or scheduled) and MUST remain immutable.

### Read/Write Separation by Default
- Analysis, reporting, and monitoring features MUST be read-only by default.
- Any write/change function (restore, remediation, promotion) MUST include preview/dry-run, explicit confirmation, audit logging, and tests.
- High-risk policy types default to `preview-only` restore unless explicitly enabled by a feature spec + tests.

### Single Contract Path to Graph
- All Microsoft Graph calls MUST go through `GraphClientInterface`.
- Object types and endpoints MUST be modeled first in the contract registry (`config/graph_contracts.php`).
- Feature code MUST NOT hardcode “quick endpoints” or bypass contracts.
- Unknown/missing policy types MUST fail safe (preview-only / no Graph calls) rather than guessing endpoints.

### Deterministic Capabilities
- Backup/restore/risk/support flags MUST be derived deterministically from config/contracts via a Capabilities Resolver.
- The resolver output MUST be programmatically testable (snapshot/golden tests) so config changes cannot silently break behavior.

### Tenant Isolation is Non-negotiable
- Every read/write MUST be tenant-scoped.
- Cross-tenant views (MSP/Platform) MUST be explicit, access-checked, and aggregation-based (no ID-based shortcuts).
- Prefer least-privilege roles/scopes; surface warnings when higher privileges are selected.
- Tenant membership is an isolation boundary. If the actor is not entitled to the tenant scope, the system MUST respond as
  deny-as-not-found (404).

### RBAC & UI Enforcement Standards (RBAC-UX)

RBAC Context — Planes, Roles, and Auditability
- The platform MUST maintain two strictly separated authorization planes:
  - Tenant plane (`/admin/t/{tenant}`): authenticated Entra users (`users`), authorization is tenant-scoped.
  - Platform plane (`/system`): authenticated platform users (`platform_users`), authorization is platform-scoped.
- Cross-plane access MUST be deny-as-not-found (404) (not 403) to avoid route enumeration.
- Tenant role semantics MUST remain least-privilege:
  - Readonly: view-only; MUST NOT start operations and MUST NOT mutate data.
  - Operator: MAY start allowed tenant operations; MUST NOT manage credentials, settings, members, or perform destructive actions.
  - Manager: MAY manage tenant configuration and start operations; MUST NOT manage tenant memberships (Owner-only).
  - Owner: MAY manage memberships and all tenant configuration; Owner-only “danger zone” actions MUST remain Owner-only.
- The system MUST prevent removing or demoting the last remaining Owner of a tenant.
- All access-control relevant changes MUST write `AuditLog` entries with stable action IDs, and MUST be redacted (no secrets).

RBAC-UX-001 — Server-side is the source of truth
- UI visibility / disabled state is never a security boundary.
- Every mutating action (create/update/delete/restore/archive/force-delete), every operation start, and every credential/
  config change MUST enforce authorization server-side via `Gate::authorize(...)` or a Policy method.
- Any missing server-side authorization is a P0 security bug.

RBAC-UX-002 — Deny-as-not-found for non-members
- Tenant membership (and plane membership) is an isolation boundary.
- If the current actor is not a member of the current tenant (or otherwise not entitled to the tenant scope), the system MUST
  respond as 404 (deny-as-not-found) for tenant-scoped routes/actions/resources.
- This applies to Filament resources/pages under tenant routing (`/admin/t/{tenant}/...`), Global Search results, and all
  action endpoints (Livewire calls included).

RBAC-UX-003 — Capability denial is 403 (after membership is established)
- Within an established tenant scope, missing permissions are authorization failures.
- If the actor is a tenant member, but lacks the required capability for an action, the server MUST fail with 403.
- The UI may render disabled actions, but the server MUST still enforce 403 on execution.

RBAC-UX-004 — Visible vs disabled UX rule
- For tenant members: actions SHOULD be visible but disabled when capability is missing.
- Disabled actions MUST provide helper text explaining the missing permission.
- For non-members: actions MUST behave as not found (404) and SHOULD NOT leak resource existence.
- Exception: highly sensitive controls (e.g., credential rotation) MAY be hidden even for members without permission.

RBAC-UX-005 — Destructive confirmation standard
- All destructive-like actions MUST require confirmation.
- Delete/force-delete/archive/restore/remove membership/role downgrade/credential rotation/break-glass enter/exit MUST use
  `->requiresConfirmation()` and SHOULD include clear warning text.
- Confirmation is UX only; authorization still MUST be server-side.

RBAC-UX-006 — Capability registry is canonical
- Capabilities MUST be centrally defined in a single canonical registry (constants/enum).
- Feature code MUST reference capabilities only via the registry (no raw string literals).
- Role → capability mapping MUST reference only registry entries.
- CI MUST fail if unknown/unregistered capabilities are used.

RBAC-UX-007 — Global search must be tenant-safe
- Global search results MUST be scoped to the current tenant.
- Non-members MUST never learn about resources in other tenants (no results, no hints).
- If a result exists but is not accessible, it MUST be treated as not found (404 semantics).

RBAC-UX-008 — Regression guards are mandatory
- The repo MUST include RBAC regression tests asserting at least:
  - Readonly cannot mutate or start operations.
  - Operator can run allowed operations but cannot manage configuration.
  - Manager/Owner behave according to the role matrix.
- The repo SHOULD include an automated “no ad-hoc authorization” guard that blocks new status/permission mappings sprinkled
  across `app/Filament/**`, pushing patterns into central helpers.

### Operations / Run Observability Standard
- Every long-running or operationally relevant action MUST be observable, deduplicated, and auditable via Monitoring → Operations.
- An action MUST create/reuse a canonical `OperationRun` and execute asynchronously when any of the following applies:
  1. It can take > 2 seconds under normal conditions.
  2. It performs remote/external calls (e.g., Microsoft Graph).
  3. It is queued or scheduled.
  4. It is operationally relevant for troubleshooting/audit (“what ran, who started it, did it succeed, what failed?”).
- Actions that are DB-only and typically complete in < 2 seconds MAY skip `OperationRun`.
- OPS-EX-AUTH-001 — Auth Handshake Exception:
  - OIDC/SAML login handshakes MAY perform synchronous outbound HTTP (e.g., token exchange) without an `OperationRun`.
  - Rationale: interactive, session-critical, and not a tenant-operational “background job”.
  - Guardrail: outbound HTTP for auth handshakes is allowed only on `/auth/*` endpoints and MUST NOT occur on Monitoring/Operations pages.
- If an action is security-relevant or affects operational behavior (e.g., “Ignore policy”), it MUST write an `AuditLog` entry
  including actor, tenant, action, target, before/after, and timestamp.
- The `OperationRun` record is the canonical source of truth for Monitoring (status, timestamps, counts, failures),
  even if implemented by multiple jobs/steps (“umbrella run”).
- “Single-row” runs MUST still use consistent counters (e.g., `total=1`, `processed=0|1`) and outcome derived from success/failure.
- Monitoring pages MUST be DB-only at render time (no external calls).
- Start surfaces MUST NOT perform remote work inline; they only: authorize, create/reuse run (dedupe), enqueue work,
  confirm + “View run”.
- Active-run dedupe MUST be enforced at DB level (partial unique index/constraint for active states).
- Failures MUST be stored as stable reason codes + sanitized messages; never persist secrets/tokens/PII/raw payload dumps
  in failures or notifications.
- Graph calls are allowed only via explicit user interaction and only when delegated auth is present; never as a render side-effect (restore group mapping is intentionally DB-only).
- Monitoring → Operations is reserved for `OperationRun`-tracked operations.
- Scheduled/queued operations MUST use locks + idempotency (no duplicates).
- Graph throttling and transient failures MUST be handled with backoff + jitter (e.g., 429/503).

### Data Minimization & Safe Logging
- Inventory MUST store only metadata + whitelisted `meta_jsonb`.
- Payload-heavy content belongs in immutable snapshots/backup storage, not Inventory.
- Logs MUST not contain secrets/tokens; monitoring MUST rely on run records + error codes (not log parsing).

### Badge Semantics Are Centralized (BADGE-001)
- Status-like badges (status/outcome/severity/risk/availability/boolean signals) MUST render via `BadgeCatalog` / `BadgeRenderer`.
- Filament resources/pages/widgets/views MUST NOT introduce ad-hoc status-like badge mappings (use a `BadgeDomain` instead).
- Introducing or changing a status-like value MUST include updating the relevant badge mapper and adding/updating tests for the mapping.
- Tag/category chips (e.g., type/platform/environment) are not status-like and are not governed by BADGE-001.

### Spec-First Workflow
- For any feature that changes runtime behavior, include or update `specs/<NNN>-<slug>/` with `spec.md`, `plan.md`, `tasks.md`, and `checklists/requirements.md`.
- New work branches from `dev` using `feat/<NNN>-<slug>` (spec + code in the same PR).

## Quality Gates
- Changes MUST be programmatically tested (Pest) and run via targeted `php artisan test ...`.
- Run `./vendor/bin/sail bin pint --dirty` before finalizing.

## Governance

### Scope & Compliance
- This constitution applies across the repo. Feature specs may add stricter constraints but not weaker ones.
- Restore semantics changes require: spec update, checklist update (if applicable), and tests proving safety.

### Amendment Procedure
- Propose changes as a PR that updates `.specify/memory/constitution.md`.
- The PR MUST include a short rationale and list of impacted templates/specs.
- Amendments MUST update **Last Amended** date.

### Versioning Policy (SemVer)
- **PATCH**: clarifications/typos/non-semantic refinements.
- **MINOR**: new principle/section or materially expanded guidance.
- **MAJOR**: removing/redefining principles in a backward-incompatible way.

**Version**: 1.6.0 | **Ratified**: 2026-01-03 | **Last Amended**: 2026-01-28