245 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
245 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
# Feature Specification: 063 — Entra Sign-in (Tenant Panel) v1
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**Feature Branch**: `063-entra-signin`
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**Created**: 2026-01-26
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**Status**: Draft (v1)
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**Scope**: Tenant Admin panel (`/admin`) sign-in only
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---
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## Context / Goal
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TenantAtlas needs a clean, enterprise-grade sign-in flow for the **Tenant Admin panel** (`/admin`) using **Microsoft Entra ID (OIDC)**.
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This feature MUST:
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- provide a Microsoft Entra sign-in entrypoint on `/admin/login` (Entra-only enforcement is finalized in Feature 064)
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- upsert tenant users safely keyed by `(entra_tenant_id, entra_object_id)`
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- route users after login based on **tenant memberships**
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- keep pages **DB-only at render time**
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- log safely (no tokens/claims dumps)
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This feature intentionally does **not** change platform/operator access (`/system`) or break-glass behavior; those belong to Feature **064-auth-structure**.
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---
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## Scope boundary (063 vs 064)
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063 introduces Entra OIDC sign-in capability for the tenant panel:
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- Entra redirect + callback
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- Safe user upsert keyed by (tid, oid)
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- Membership-based post-login routing (0 / 1 / N memberships)
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Making "/admin" fully **Entra-only** (removing local form login and removing any break-glass/operator UX from /admin) is finalized in **Feature 064 (Auth Structure)**.
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---
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## Clarifications
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### Session 2026-01-26
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- Q: For a user belonging to multiple tenants, what should happen immediately after they sign in? → A: Redirect to a dedicated, full-screen "tenant chooser" page that lists all their memberships. The user must click one to proceed to the main dashboard.
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- Q: If a user record exists in a disabled state (e.g., `deleted_at` is not null, or an `is_active` flag is false), and that user completes a valid Entra ID sign-in, what should happen? → A: Block the login. Redirect the user to the login page with a generic error message (e.g., "Your account is disabled. Please contact an administrator.").
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- Q: What is the v1 DB strategy for users.entra_tenant_id / users.entra_object_id? → A: Keep existing columns/types if present (currently varchar(255) nullable) and keep the existing unique composite index. Do not enforce NOT NULL or type-change in v1.
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---
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### Session 2026-01-27
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- Q: How should the Entra Tenant ID (`tid`) be treated in logs? → A: Log the `entra_tenant_id` in plaintext. Rationale: `tid` is a tenant identifier, not a user secret. Plaintext is valuable for operations and incident response. The primary PII (`oid`) is hashed.
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---
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## Existing System Compatibility (important)
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The repository already contains:
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- A **System Panel** at `/system` using guard `platform` and `platform_users` (platform operator access).
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- Break-glass recovery mechanics for platform operators (banner/middleware/routes).
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- Tenant membership storage using a pivot table (`tenant_user` or equivalent) with role values via `TenantRole` enum.
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**Compatibility constraints for 063**
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- 063 MUST NOT modify `/system` panel, platform guards, platform users, or break-glass routes/UX.
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- 063 MUST NOT refactor tenant RBAC data model or enforcement. It may only **read** memberships to decide where to redirect after login.
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- 063 MUST NOT introduce Graph calls (or any outbound HTTP) during render/poll/hydration of `/admin` pages.
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---
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## Non-Goals (explicit)
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- No Platform Operator `/system` login implementation (already exists or handled elsewhere).
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- No break-glass UX on `/admin/login`.
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- No tenant RBAC redesign or role enforcement changes (assume memberships already exist).
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- No Graph calls or remote work in login render/poll/hydration.
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- No storing of Entra access/refresh tokens.
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- No queue/worker dependence for login (login is synchronous request/response).
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---
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## User Scenarios & Testing (mandatory)
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### User Story 1 — Entra sign-in entrypoint on `/admin/login` (Priority: P1)
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A tenant user can start Microsoft Entra sign-in from `/admin/login`.
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**Acceptance Scenarios**
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1. Given I open `/admin/login`, then I see only “Sign in with Microsoft” and no email/password fields.
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2. Given Entra config is missing/invalid, `/admin/login` still renders and shows a generic message (no secrets).
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**Independent Test**
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- Render `/admin/login` and assert no password inputs exist.
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---
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### User Story 2 — OIDC callback upserts tenant identity safely (Priority: P1)
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The callback upserts a tenant user using Entra claims.
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**Acceptance Scenarios**
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1. Given Entra callback includes `tid` and `oid`, when sign-in completes, then `users` is upserted keyed by:
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- `entra_tenant_id = tid`
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- `entra_object_id = oid`
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2. Given sign-in succeeds, then the session is regenerated.
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3. Given callback is missing `tid` or `oid`, then redirect to `/admin/login` with a generic error.
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4. Given a user exists but is disabled (soft-deleted), when they complete a valid sign-in, then they are redirected to /admin/login with a generic error.
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**Independent Test**
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- Fake a callback payload and assert `(tid, oid)` uniqueness is enforced.
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---
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- Q: What is the specific title and primary message for the `/admin/no-access` page? → A: Title: "No Access", Message: "Please contact an administrator for access."
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### User Story 3 — Post-login routing is membership-based (Priority: P1)
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After login, routing depends on Suite tenant memberships.
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**Acceptance Scenarios**
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1. Given I have 0 memberships, then redirect to `/admin/no-access`.
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2. Given I have exactly 1 membership, then redirect into that tenant’s dashboard.
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3. Given I have >1 memberships, then redirect to a dedicated, full-screen tenant chooser page, displaying tenant name and role for each option.
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**Independent Test**
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- Seed memberships and assert each redirect path.
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---
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### User Story 4 — Filament-native “No access” page (Priority: P2)
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Users without memberships get a safe, Filament-native page.
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**Acceptance Scenarios**
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1. Given I have 0 memberships, `/admin/no-access` renders using Filament UI (no raw HTML pages), with the title "No Access" and the message "Please contact an administrator for access.".
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2. The page does not leak internal details; it provides next steps (“Ask an admin to add you”).
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---
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## Requirements (mandatory)
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### Functional Requirements
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- **FR-001**: `/admin/login` MUST offer a "Sign in with Microsoft" entrypoint that starts the Entra OIDC flow. (Entra-only removal of local/break-glass UX is finalized in Feature 064.)
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- **FR-002**: Tenant user upsert MUST be keyed by `(entra_tenant_id, entra_object_id)` and MUST NOT store Entra access/refresh tokens.
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- **FR-003**: Post-login routing MUST be based on memberships:
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- 0 → `/admin/no-access`
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- 1 → tenant dashboard
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- N → dedicated tenant chooser page, displaying tenant name and role for each option.
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- **FR-004**: OIDC failures MUST be handled safely:
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- redirect to `/admin/login` with generic error
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- log stable `reason_code` + `correlation_id`
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- never log token/claims payloads
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- **FR-005**: Logging MUST be privacy-safe:
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- success: minimal (user_id, tid, oid hash, timestamp, correlation_id)
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- failure: `reason_code`, correlation_id, minimal diagnostics
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- **FR-006**: `/admin/login`, `/admin/no-access`, and `/admin/choose-tenant` MUST be DB-only at render/hydration time (no outbound HTTP).
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- **FR-007**: 063 MUST NOT surface break-glass links or platform login UX on `/admin/login`.
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- **FR-008**: Session separation MUST prevent implicit crossover:
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- a tenant session MUST NOT grant access to `/system`
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- a platform session MUST NOT grant access to `/admin` tenant membership routes
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(Implementation is via separate guards/panels; 063 only asserts behavior via tests.)
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- **FR-009**: Login flow MUST NOT require queue workers; it must complete synchronously.
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- **FR-010**: If a user record exists but is in a disabled or soft-deleted state, a successful Entra ID authentication MUST be blocked, and the user redirected to the login page with a generic error.
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### Non-Functional Requirements (NFR)
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- **NFR-01 (Security)**: Do not persist secrets/tokens. Sanitize all error output and logs.
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- **NFR-02 (Stability)**: Callback is idempotent; safe to retry without creating duplicates.
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- **NFR-03 (Performance)**: Callback returns within ~2s under normal conditions.
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- **NFR-04 (Maintainability)**: Minimal diff; do not refactor membership/RBAC models.
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---
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## Auth handshake exception to Operations/Run standard
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The Operations/Run Observability standard applies to queued/long-running tenant operations (sync, restore, drift, provider ops). The Entra OIDC sign-in handshake is an interactive authentication flow that necessarily performs outbound HTTPS to Entra endpoints during the callback.
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This auth handshake is explicitly exempt from the OperationRun requirement:
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- It is user-initiated and must complete synchronously to establish a session.
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- It does not represent a tenant-scoped background operation.
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- It must not enqueue jobs or perform remote work beyond the OIDC exchange.
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Guardrail: Only the `/auth/entra/*` endpoints may perform outbound HTTP for OIDC. `/admin/login`, `/admin/no-access`, and `/admin/choose-tenant` remain DB-only at render/hydration time.
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---
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## Data Model
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063 reuses the existing `users` table.
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**Current repo state (authoritative for v1):**
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- `entra_tenant_id` (varchar(255), nullable)
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- `entra_object_id` (varchar(255), nullable)
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- Unique composite index on (`entra_tenant_id`, `entra_object_id`) already exists.
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**v1 decision (enterprise-safe, minimal-risk):**
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- Keep both columns **nullable** in v1.
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- Do **not** change column types (no uuid migration) in v1.
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- Do **not** enforce NOT NULL in v1.
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Optional (if already present / used later):
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- `last_tenant_id` (nullable FK to `tenants.id`) to optimize redirect for multi-membership users.
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No new tables required.
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---
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## Routes / UI Surfaces
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- `/admin/login` — Filament login override (Entra-only CTA)
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- `/auth/entra/redirect` — starts OIDC redirect (Socialite)
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- `/auth/entra/callback` — handles callback, upsert, routing
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- `/admin/no-access` — Filament page for 0-membership users
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- `/admin/choose-tenant` — Filament page for N-membership users to select a tenant
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---
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## OIDC Handling & Failure Semantics
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### Claims requirements
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- `tid` (tenant id) MUST be present.
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- `oid` (object id) MUST be present.
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If missing → fail safely.
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### Generic user-facing error
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- “Authentication failed. Please try again.”
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### Server-side logging
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Log event `auth.entra.login` with:
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- `success`: boolean
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- `reason_code`: string (on failure)
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- `user_id`: (on success)
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- `entra_tenant_id`: tid (plaintext, for Ops correlation)
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- `entra_object_id_hash`: hash(oid)
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- `correlation_id`: request id or session id
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- `timestamp`
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### Reason code examples (stable)
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- `oidc_missing_claims`
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- `oidc_invalid_state`
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- `oidc_user_denied`
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- `oidc_provider_unavailable`
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- `oidc_user_upsert_failed`
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- `user_disabled`
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---
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## Implementation Guardrails (hard)
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- Do not implement a password login form for `/admin`.
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- Do not call `$this->form->fill()` with default creds.
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- Do not show break-glass link/button on `/admin/login`.
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- Do not modify `/system` panel, platform guards, or break-glass logic.
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- Do not refactor `User::tenants()` or membership schema; use a small resolver/service to decide redirect.
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- Do not make outbound HTTP during render/hydration of /admin/login, /admin/no-access, or /admin/choose-tenant. Outbound HTTP is permitted only inside /auth/entra/* endpoints for the OIDC exchange.
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- Do not store raw claims or tokens.
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---
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## Acceptance Tests (required)
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### Feature tests (Pest)
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1. **AdminLoginIsEntraOnlyTest**
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- GET `/admin/login` contains Microsoft CTA
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- asserts no `password` input / no local login form
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2. **EntraCallbackUpsertByTidOidTest**
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- callback upserts user by `(tid, oid)` (unique)
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- session is regenerated
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3. **PostLoginRoutingByMembershipTest**
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- 0 memberships → `/admin/no-access`
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- 1 membership → tenant dashboard
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- N memberships → chooser page
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4. **OidcFailureRedirectsSafelyTest**
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- missing tid/oid → redirect `/admin/login`
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- logs contain `reason_code` + `correlation_id`
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- logs do not contain tokens/claims dumps
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5. **SessionSeparationSmokeTest**
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- tenant session cannot access `/system`
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- platform session cannot access tenant membership routes without membership
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6. **DisabledUserLoginIsBlockedTest**
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- Seed a disabled/soft-deleted user
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- Fake a successful OIDC callback for that user
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- Assert redirect to /admin/login
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- Assert log contains `reason_code: user_disabled`
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### Quality gate
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- `./vendor/bin/sail bin pint --dirty`
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- `./vendor/bin/sail artisan test tests/Feature/Auth --stop-on-failure`
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---
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## Manual Verification Checklist
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1. Open `/admin/login` - only Microsoft sign-in CTA visible
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2. Complete Entra sign-in - user record exists with tid/oid
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3. 0 memberships → `/admin/no-access`
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4. 1 membership → tenant dashboard
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5. >1 memberships → chooser page
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6. Verify logs:
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- failures show reason_code + correlation_id
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- no tokens/claims in logs
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---
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## Out of Scope / Follow-ups
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- **064-auth-structure**: `/system` operator login hardening, break-glass UX, panel separation governance.
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- **062-tenant-rbac-v1**: role enforcement audit + resource-by-resource authorization hardening.
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- Advanced Entra topics (v2+): delegated flows, refresh token storage, certificate auth, conditional access UI. |